National Advertising Company v. Utah State Road Commission, Henry C. Helland, Ralph C. Anderson and Mercer D. Smith : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
National Advertising Company v. Utah State Road
Commission, Henry C. Helland, Ralph C.
Anderson and Mercer D. Smith : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gordon L. Roberts; Parsons, Behle, and Latimer; Attorneys for Respondent .
Vernon B. Romney; Donald S. Coleman; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, National Advertising Company v. Utah State Road Commission, No. 12198.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/688
'J :;,A!EF 
.9 _ _ 
CKETNO. l iM^&f t . Of Utah 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
—vs.— 
THE UTAH STATE ROAD COM-
MISSION, HENRY C. HELLAND, / Case No. 12198 
Director of Highways; RALPH C. 
ANDERSON, Coordinator, Outdoor 
Advertising Controls, and MERCER 
D. SMITH, Permit Control Officer, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, 
STEWART M. HANSON, DISTRICT JUDGE, 
PRESIDING 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & 
LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attroney General 
and 
DONALD S. COLEMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR THIS APPEAL AND ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT A NOTICE OF APPEAL HAD NOT BEEN 
TIMELY FILED 4 
POINT II 
THE ROAD COMMISSION HAD NO POWER WHAT-
SOEVER TO REMOVE THE SIGN IN QUESTION 12 
CONCLUSION 22 
CASES CITED 
Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
132 W. Va. 650, 54 S.E. 2d 169 9 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, et al., v. 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d 
105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955) 20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued 
Page 
Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 
(1955) 10 
Ewing v. City of St. Louis, 104 U.S. 630, 18 L.Ed. 657 (1866).. 21 
Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W. 2d 620, 35 ALR 
2d 1003 (1952) 14 
liegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 79 L.Ed. 
259, 55 S. Ct. 7 11 
P. F. Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570, 78 L. Ed. 
505, 54 S. Ct. 277 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING | 
COMPANY, a corporation, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, I 
—vs.— F 
THE UTAH STATE KOAD COM- I 
MISSION, HENRY C. HELLAND, > Case No. 12198 
Director of Highways; RALPH C. I 
ANDERSON, Coordinator, Outdoor I 
Advertising Controls, and MERCER | 
D. SMITH, Permit Control Officer, 1 
Defendants-Appellants. ] 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Road Commission of the State of Utah deter-
mined, at an administrative hearing, that one of the sign 
or advertising structures maintained by Respondent, 3M 
National Advertising Company, was illegal and ordered 
the removal of the sign. Thereafter, Respondent brought 
an action in the Third District Court seeking (1) reversal 
by appeal of the decision of the Highway iCommission and 
(2) independently seeking injunctive relief preventing the 
removal of the sign. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWEE COURT 
The statement contained in the Brief of Appellants 
in this respect is essentially accurate. 
- BELIEF-SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
v , The statement contained in Appellants' Brief in this 
connection is essentially accurate also. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1964, National Advertising constructed and in-
stalled a sign at the quadrant of 21st South and Eedwood 
Eoad. The sign faced Eedwood Eoad. (E. 98) (Photo-
graph — Ex. 1-P). As of May, 1967, the Highway Beau-
tification Act became effective. In approximately Sep-
tember of 1967, Mr. Neil Christiansen of National Adver-
tising and Mr. Mercer Smith of the State Eoad Commis-
sion reviewed and inspected the site of the original 
"Farmers" sign. (E. 99, et seq.). There were various 
conversations between the gentlemen at this time re-
garding changing the direction of the sign, the size of the 
sign, and the location of the sign. (E. 99-101; 120-23). 
Subsequently, an application for a permit was filed by 
National Advertising with the Utah State Department 
of Highways. (See Ex. 3-P). The permit was issued. 
(Ex. 3-P — It will be noted that the application bears 
an endorsement as having been approved by the District 
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Engineer). A new sign facing 21st South, being larger 
than the previous sign, and being located some 35 feet 
north of the previous sign, was constructed as of January 
26, 1968. {11. 100 02). " Hie old sign \v;i: ; ti< >t removed for 
approximately 60 days following the completion <n* iin-
new sign due I*- muddy ground conditions at the situs "f 
Mi*- uld s ign. ^ \l l'*-i). 
The new sign, referred to as 1li«- AnuM-i^r* Oil sign, 
cost approximately $5,000.00 to construct (R. I*'.'! s. and i-
the subject * r r. l.-uir u nn contract with American n's! 
Company whicJi v H < i •.• < ; n ^Vbruary of 1072 l"R. 1 * *; . 
American 0;1 Company pays .fl^ OOO i.i«, : n-ul. *.* \ a 
tional Advertising \'<>r iliis advertising space. (W M-^  
Ultimately, the State Road ( Vmimissioi i challenged 
the legality of the American Oil sign and a hearing was 
held before the Road Commission. (R. 40-53). A decision 
was issued in which the Road Commission found that the 
sign was illegal. (R. 54-55). 
There followed a series of negotiations, letters, and 
further hearings culminating on J..!.. i969 in a rin.ii 
decision b> the Road Commission that it would a**-
change its original opinion. (The exact dates and tran-
script references in this respect are contained in Point 
I of the Brief hereinafter.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
On July 22, 1969, plaintiff filed its complaint in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of'-Utah 
containing two causes of action — the first being an 
appeal from the decision of the Road Commission, and 
the second challenging the constitutionality of the threat-
ened action of the Road Commission to remove the sign. 
(R. 1-5). Trial was held before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson who ruled that the appeal was not timely 
but that the sign nonetheless was lawful and could not be 
removed. Judge Hanson issued an injunction according-
ly. (See (R. 79-84). 
I t is the basic position of Respondent herein that 
Judge Hanson erred in determining that the appeal had 
not been timely filed and Ave herewith make a cross-
assignment of error to that effect. It is also our position 
that, regardless of the timeliness of the appeal, the sign 
is yalid and the injunction should remain in effect. 
u POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR THIS APPEAL AND ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT A NOTICE OF APPEAL HAD NOT BEEN 
TIMELY FILED. 
The state urges in its Brief (Point I) that the notice 
of appeal from the decision of the Road Commission was 
untimely and thus the District Court should not have 
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summarily dismissed the case. To the contrary, we submit 
that the record undeniably points to the conclusion that 
the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, 
that the notice of appeal was timely filed, and that, in all 
events, the Regulation upon which the State relies is 
invalid. 
(a) Road Commission Regulation 25. 
A decision by the Road Commission under the High-
way Beautification Act is subject to judicial review by 
statute. (Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.9). The stat-
ute does not specify any time limit in which the appeal 
must be filed. However, the Road Commission purported 
to enact its own legislation on the subject which appears 
in Regulation 2 5(R. 12) as follows: 
"25. Notice of appeal from the Commission 
decision shall be in writing, directed to the Di-
rector of Highways, postmarked or filed prior to 
the 30th day from receipt of the Findings, Conclu-
sions and Decision of the Commission." 
I t is significant to note that the State here bases its ease 
on Regulation 25 (see State's Brief at p. 4), and that 
Judge Hanson likewise rested his decision as to the time-
liness of the appeal on the same Regulation. (R. 82 — 
Finding (1) ; R. 83-4 — Conclusion (1)). We believe that 
there is an excellent answer to both the State and Judge 
Hanson: it has been judicially determined in a final 
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order of the Third District Court (Judge Emmett L. 
Brown presiding) that Regulation 25 "is invalid and of 
no force and effect because the Utah State Highway 
Commission had no power, statutory or otherwise, to 
promulgate said Regulation." (R. 21). 
This matter came up in connection with a motion to 
dismiss filed by the Road Commission on the same ground 
which it is now urging on appeal (R. 10-11) and Judge 
Brown invalidated the Regulation. No appeal has been 
taken by the State from Judge Brown's order and cer-
tainly Judge Hanson had no appellate jurisdiction to 
overrule Judge Brown. Thus, the Brown order is final 
and unimpeachable — anything in Judge Hanson's Find-
ings to the contrary is superfluous and the State's case 
on this appeal must fail — this is the law of the case. 
(b) In all events, National Advertising timely noti-
fied the Road Commission of its appeal. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that there is some appli-
cable thirty-day time limit in which to perfect an appeal 
from the Road Commission, Respondent here has met 
that limit and timely filed its action in District Court. 
The brevity of the State's brief, although commend-
able, is really somewhat misleading as to the true factual 
background in connection with the timeliness of the ap-
peal. The State merely points out—-
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(1) The decision of the Road Commission was sent 
certified mail on January 20, 1969 (State's 
Brief— p. 3). 
(2) Plaintiff filed its action in District Court on 
July 22, 1969 — well over 30 days past January 
20,1969. (State's Brief — p. 4). 
These harsh facts, alone, would certainly tend to support 
the State's position (again assuming arguendo some legal 
requirement for filing within 30 days), but the State has 
simply ignored a whole host of interstitial facts which 
change the picture entirely. The exact chronology, un-
disputed of record, i s : 
(1) Regardless of when the order was in fact sent 
by the Commission, plaintiff first learned of it 
on March 31,1969. (R. 106). 
(2) National Advertising promptly requested an ex-
tension of time in which to appeal by letter of 
April 3, 1969. (R. 37). 
(3) The Road Commission granted a formal exten-
sion of time to National per its letter of April 
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8, 1969 — said extension to run to May 8, 1969. 
- (R. 36).* 
(4) Prior to May 8th, 1969, a representative of Na-
tional Advertising, Mr. Christiansen, had a fur-
ther discussion with Ralph C. Anderson, Coor-
dinator of Outdoor Advertising Controls for the 
Road Commission. (R. 102). They discussed a 
possible solution to the matter by trading off 
another sign location. The matter was left open 
(R. 109), and pursuant to the discussion an ap-
plication to change was filed on May 13, 1969. 
(R. 35). This clearly pertained to the sign here 
under litigation as may be seen from the para-
~ graph at the bottom of the application. (See also 
accompanying letter — R. 34). 
(5) On June Sy1969 a letter was sent by the Road 
Commission to National Advertising (R. 33) ad-
vising that the proposed trade could not be ap-
proved. 
^Counsel for the State may quibble about whether the State's 
letter (R. 36) is in fact an extension for time to appeal as op-
posed to an extension of time in which to tear the sign down. 
Taken in the context of the April 3rd letter (R. 37) to which 
it responds, the April 8th letter clearly grants an extension on 
the appeal — note that specific reference to "appeal" time is 
made in the April 3rd letter. 
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(6) A letter dated June 11,1969 was sent which can 
fairly be construed as a final order for removal 
of the sign by June 20,1969. (R. 32). 
(7) Mr. Christiansen of National again met with Le-
Vaun Cox, Commissioner of the Road Commis-
sion, whereat Commissioner Cox indicated he 
would present the sign matter to the whole Com-
mission on July 11, 1969 at its meeting. (R. I l l , 
R. 31). 
(8) A letter in the nature of a petition for recon-
sideration was filed by National with the Com-
mission on July 10,1969. (R. 31). 
(9) National was advised following the July 11 Com-
mission meeting that the Commission refused to 
reverse its decision. (R. 112). 
(10) Suit was filed on July 22,1969. (R. 1). 
Our position is quite simple — the administrative 
action was never final until the Connnission meeting of 
July 11,1969, when, for once and for all, the Commission 
refused to reconsider or reverse its decision. The appeal 
was filed promptly thereafter. It seems clear that the 
time for appeal runs not from the original order but from 
a denial of a petition for reconsideration. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 132 W. Va. 
650, 54 S.E. 2d 169. 
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I t must be remembered that we are not dealing with 
a court of law where post-trial procedures have a certain 
aura of formality and definiteness about them. There 
are explicit and definite rules on new trial (Rule 59), 
relief from judgment (Rule 60) or judgment (Rule 50). 
Lawyers are familiar with these practices and the entire 
procedure is predictable and definite. An administrative 
agency, however, functions differently. The very purpose 
of such agencies is to allow parties to iron out problems 
within the scope of "administrative expertise" in a very 
informal manner, without laywers in many cases, without 
formal motions and rules, and without clear rules which 
define the procedural aspects of the proceeding. This 
Court has expressly dealt with the distinction between 
administrative and judicial proceedings and has clearly 
supported our contentions in this respect, In Entre Nous 
Club vs. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), the 
court noted: 
"The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the 
rules for the Government of the courts adjudicat-
ing formal contest between adverse parties, 
U.R.C.P., Rule 1 (a) and Rule 81, Vol 9, UCA 
1953; clearly they are inapplicable to a proceeding 
before an administrative body seeking to regulate 
activities burdened with the public interest. Dif-
ferences in the parties, the experience of the hear-
ing officer in the particular matter, the considera-
tions involved, and the objects to be obtained 
point up the need for more flexible procedure 
before agencies and administrative officers than 
is utilized in the trial of a case at law. Federal 
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Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142-143, 60 S. Ct. 437, 
84 L.Ed. 656." 
Of equal importance is the doctrine of "exhaustion 
of remedies" which pertains to administrative but not 
judicial proceedings. In the instant situation, for ex-
ample, assume that a suit was filed by National in latter 
June when one of the Eoad Commissioners had indicated 
that the matter would be presented for reconsideration to 
the entire Commission. Had a suit been filed at that time, 
it would clearly have been subject to dismissal on the 
grounds that the matter was still pending before the 
Commission, that it was not ripe for judicial review, and 
that plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative reme-
dies. (There are numerous cases so holding — see, e.g., 
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 79 L.Ed. 
259, 55 S. Ct. 7; P. F. Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 
U.S. 570, 78 L. Ed. 505, 54 S. Ct. 277). 
Another facet of this case bears on the equities of the 
State's position. Eepresentatives of the plaintiff were 
clearly lulled into a false sense of security. They as-
sumed, and reasonably so, that the matter was still 
pending before the Commission until July 11, 1969. At 
no time did the Commission or its representatives indi-
cate that the matter was final or that judicial review was 
precluded. Under these circumstances, it hardly behooves 
the State to seek a hypertechnical, hyperformal applica-
tion of stringent time limits on appeal. Indeed, were 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
the State not clothed with its "King can do no wrong" 
aura, it should surely be estopped from asserting this 
defense at all. 
W TP T? "R* *5P 
We submit, therefore, by way of cross assignment 
of error, that Judge Hanson erred (a) in finding that 
the appeal was not timely and (b) in applying a Begula-
tion which was previously held to be invalid. Judge 
Hanson did have appellate jurisdiction to hear the cause. 
POINT II 
THE ROAD COMMISSION HAD NO POWER WHAT-
SOEVER TO REMOVE THE SIGN IN QUESTION. 
A. Background of the Act 
This case involves the so-called Highway Beautifi-
cation Act. It requires but a brief look at the Utah stat-
ute (commencing Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.1) to 
see that the "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act" is nothing 
more or less than a response to the Federal Government 
for legislation Indeed, the purpose of the Act as set 
forth in Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.2 makes speci-
fic reference to "Title 23 of the United States Code" and 
the "Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965." U.S. 
Code references are also contained in the definitions 
(27-12-136.3), the Congress of the United States and the 
Secretary of Commerce are mentioned prominently in 
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the minimum standards section (27-12-136.5), the Federal 
Highway Beautification Act is again mentioned in 27-
12-136.6, indeed the power of the Highway Commission 
is restricted by the "minimum national standards promul-
gated by the Secretary pursuant to Title 23 U.S. Code 
(supra). The amazing thing is that although in response 
to the Federal Government and in order to obtain high-
way funds, the State of Utah has enacted a complex maze 
of legislative and regulatory provisions regarding high-
way beauty, placement of signs, junk yards etc., to our 
knowledge not one nickel of funds has been appropriated 
for the purpose of paying just compensation to anyone 
whose sign is taken down. The Legislature must have 
been apprehensive about this problem since in Section 
27-12-136.11 it s p e ^ f l l y provided: 
"Despite any contrary provision in this Act, 
no sign shall be required to be removed unless at 
the time of removal there are sufficient funds, 
from whatever source, appropriated and immedi-
ately available to this State with which to pay the 
just compensation required under this Section, 
and unless at such time the Federal funds re-
quired to be contributed to this State under Sec-
tion 131 of Title 23, United States Code, have been 
appropriated and are immediately available to 
this State." (Ephasis added.) 
I t is a well known fact which has been the subject 
of substantial national publicity that no funds have been 
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appropriated under Section 131 of Title 23 for the State 
of Utah. Indeed, Judge Hanson so found. (R. 83). 
B. The proceedings below 
Our first position in this case is, as set forth in 
Point I, that Judge Hanson erred in determining that 
our appeal was not timely and thus his decision has 
the effect of reversing that of the Road Commission. 
Should the Court determine that we did not timely 
file our appeal, we submit that the thirty-day appeal 
provision is inapplicable to our second cause of action 
which attacks the Road Commission on broader grounds. 
The Second Cause of Action (R. 3-4) is meant to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of any action on the par t of 
the Highway Commission in interfering with or remov-
ing the sign in question. There is eminent and clearly 
analogous authority to the effect that under these cir-
cumstances, a statute limiting time for appeal is inappli-
cable. In the case of Hadden vs. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 
55 N.W. 2d 620, 35 ALR 2d 1003 (1952), a very similar 
question was presented. The act in question in that 
case, involving motor vehicle licenses, required the filing 
of a Petition for Appeal within 60 days following the 
receipt of an order. The plaintiff in the case failed to 
comply with this provision and the Appellant, as here, 
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sought to dismiss the case for failure to file a timely 
Petition for Appeal. We quote from the pertinent part 
of the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska: 
"Appellants again raise their motion to dis-
miss the proceedings. This motion we have al-
ready denied. The basis for the motion is that 
Appellee did not file his petition during the time 
within which Section 60-503 BBS 1943, provides 
that appeals must be taken. (Quoting statute). 
"If this proceeding is an appeal from the 
order of October 30, 1951, then it is out of time 
and the motion should be sustained. (Citing 
cases). However, we do not think the petition 
was for the purpose of perfecting an appeal from 
the order of October 30, 1951, but that it was 
filed as an original action in equity seeking to 
permanently enjoin the enforcement of the order 
of October 30, 1951, on the grounds that the legis-
lation is, in several respects, unconstitutional,," 
Therefore, the Court refused to dismiss the appeal on 
the ground that it sought broader relief than merely 
appeal — as here, it sought to permanently enjoin uncon-
stitutional administrative action. 
We believe this case constates sound precedent 
which should be followed in this case in the event the 
Court determines that we have not timely perfected our 
appeal. 
C. The merits of the controversy 
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I t should be noted that Appellant really makes no 
arguments concerning the merits of the controversy but 
simply argues (in Point I of its Brief) that the Court 
had no jurisdiction and (in Point I I of its Brief) that 
procedural due process was granted to National Adver-
tising Company through the hearing at the State Road 
Commission. 
This sterile approach really ignores the factual con-
troversy in the case. The key point in controversy was 
whether or not the State had issued a permit for the 
construction of an American Oil sign at the quadrant 
of 21st South and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County. 
The Highway Commission originally held that no such 
permit had been issued. As far as can be determined 
from the rather cryptic record before the Road Com-
mission, this finding was predicated upon the testimony 
of one Mercer D. Smith who was the Permit Control 
Officer for the State. There had originally been a smaller 
sign reading for an insurance company on Redwood 
Road. An application was timely filed to change this 
sign structure into the new structure referred to as the 
American Oil sign. (See R. 62). The new structure was 
located in a different place, faced a different direction, 
and was larger than the previous structure, and the 
basic question is whether the permit which was granted 
(R. 62), covered the new sign. Mercer D. Smith origi-
nally testified before the Road Commission that he did 
not intend the permit to cover the new sign. His testi-
mony was as follows: 
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: "The permit, as far as I am concerned, was 
for the smaller sign and not for this larger one 
and my idea was to pivot the sign 90° and not 
remove it now a distance between the initial sign 
and this sign which is about 35 feet further to the 
, /North." (E. 47) 
I t might be observed that this was a statement given 
extemporaneously by Mr. Smith at the Eoad Commission 
hearing — significantly, he was not cross examined. At 
the time of the trial, the State presented Mr. Smith as 
a witness. On cross examination, his testimony was 
much more elaborate as to just what was and what was 
not intended by the permit which was granted: 
"Q. So isn't it a fact, Mr. Smith, even based on 
your own testimony, that when you issued 
this permit you realized that the sign that 
was to be constructed had the following dif-
ferences from the previous sign. One is there 
would be a 90-degree turn there? 
"A. Eight. Eight. , ; 
"Q. And No. 2, it would be a larger sign? 
"A. True. 
"Q. True. Even tough the permit does not speak 
in terms of a larger sign you knew that w a^s 
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what tthey were thinking about, and that was 
what the permit covered? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And No. 3, presumably there would have to 
be additional pole structure to support the 
larger sign? 
"A. True. 
"Q. And that is what you intended, is that correct, 
Sir? 
"A. For the same sign, yes. 
"Q. And for that the sign would have to be 
higher? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. No question about that? 
"A. No question/' (R .122-23) 
I t was on the basis of this clear evidence that Judge 
Hanson ruled that the permit in fact covered the new 
sign and therefore that the sign was lawful. In the 
Court's Memorandum Decision (R. 79), the following 
finding is found: 
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"That-the permit given for the .erection of 
the sign in question was valid and the construc-
tion of said sign was in conformance with the 
intent and purpose of the permit." 
Also significantly, Judge Hanson held that the new sign 
was merely a "lawful continuation" of the previous sign. 
(K, 83). 
Since under the clear evidence the sign was lawful 
and a permit had been granted, it follows that the sign 
could not be removed without the payment of just com-
pensation. (Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 27-12-136.11). 
I t further follows that since the sign was merely a 
lawful continuation of previously existing outdoor adver-
tising, the statute itself precludes the removal of the 
sign as follows: 
"Any outdoor advertising lawfully in exist-
ence along the interstate or the primary systems 
on the effective date of this Act and which is not 
then in conformity with its provisions may not 
be required to be removed until December 31, 
1972, except for violation of Sec, 27-12-136.8 or 
pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 27-12-136.11." 
{Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 27-12-136.10). 
Appellant does not question any of these principles 
of law nor does it question the basic substantive merits 
of Judge Hanson's rulings. .• ; : .- x 
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The only possible impropriety that might be raised 
is that Judge Hanson took additional evidence, beyond 
that which was received at the administrative hearing. 
It is unclear whether Judge Hanson's decison was based 
upon the evidence at the administrative hearing or that 
which was taken at the time of trial, and we submit that 
this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Respond-
ent under normal rules of appellate presumptions. How-
ever, and going further, it seems clear that since the 
Court was looking to broad constitutional question, as 
to whether the property rights of plaintiff could be 
taken without just compensaion, the Court was certainly 
justified in adducing additional evidence to clarify the 
admittedly meager record from the administrative pro-
ceeding. There is substantial precedent to support such 
actions. For example, in Denver & Bio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., et al, vs. Central Weber Sewer Improve-
ment District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955), this 
Court observed: 
"Ordinarily on writ of review the certified 
record alone is examinable. Not so, however, 
where the record and determination of the Com-
mission or board are unsupported by some kind 
of reasonably substantial proof. In such event the 
judiciary may awaken to question their warrant, 
and in doing so, may receive, examine and weigh 
evidence, if necssary, as it did here on stipu-
lated facts, to the end that due process guaran-
tees will maintain." (Citing numerous cases). 
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Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States 
in an early decision in Swing vs. City of St. Louis, 104 
U.S. 630, 18 L.Ed. 657 (1866), stated as follows: 
"With the proceedings and determinations of 
inferior boards or tribunals of special jurisdic-
tions, courts of equity will not interfere, unless 
it should become necssary to prevent a multipli-
city of suits or irreparable injury, or unless the 
proceedings sought to be annulled or corrected is 
valid upon its face, and the alleged invalidity 
consists in matters to be established by extrinsic 
evidence." 
Our point is simple. When matters of constitutional 
significance are involved such as the taking of private 
property without just compensation, a court of equity 
has inherent jurisdiction to take additional facts in order 
to determine the true merits of the controversy. 
Moreover, the key testimony was the testimony of 
Mercer D. Smith on cross examination at the time of the 
trial. The State put Mr. Smith on the stand (E, 117) 
and elicited direct testimony from him. Therefore, the 
State is precluded from objecting to testimony elicited 
through the cross examination of Mr. Smith and the 
same was properly before the Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
We wish to stress that we are dealing here with 
property rights of a very substantial nature. The sign 
in question is placed upon real property for which Na-
tion Advertising pays a rental. It also receives a rental 
from American Oil Company for the advertising struc-
ture in question. Judge Hanson found and it is not 
disputed that National Advertising has had advertising 
structures continuously in this same geographical loca-
tion for several months preceding the effective date of 
the Highway Beautifaction Act. The State is here seek-
ing to remove such sign and to deprive National Adver-
tising of the revenues which are derived from the sign. 
Where private property is thus at stake, the full force 
of the due process clause of Amendment 14 to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah 
State Constitution must be brought to bear. The State 
should not be allowed to rely upon intricacies of appel-
late time limits or other hypertechnical rules. Rather, 
the State should be prepared to meet, in substance, the 
demand that the sign in question was a lawful sign and 
its removal must be accompanied by the payment of just 
compensation. Since the State is clearly unable and 
unwilling to pay just compensation, the removal of the 
sign would be unconstitutional. In substance, there is 
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no question but that the sign should remain where it is. 
Judge Hanson has so held and it is respectfully sub-
mited that he should be sustained. 
Gordon L. Roberts 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
